Russia and The EU: Cold War 2.0?

Elliot Wood | 1st April 2021

Last week, the leaders of the EU nations gathered to tackle the most pressing challenges to the bloc of 27. The agenda looked promising: vaccinations, US relations, the single market, the Eastern Mediterranean and Russia, yet the Council’s ultimate statement was anything but promising. Of course, the UK are now rightly fretting about vaccine nationalisation but whilst that’s happening, a much larger, more ominous problem has slipped under the radar.

Go to the end of the 7-page European Council March Summit statement and there’s a title, ‘RUSSIA’, followed by two pathetic sentences which read:

“We were informed about the latest developments in the relations between the European Union and Russia. We will hold a strategic debate at a forthcoming European Council meeting.”

It’s a little underwhelming to say the least.

Yet the implications of the EU’s attitude of disregard towards Russia will have far reaching consequences for European and global politics. Whilst all the world observes the Sino-US pendulum swing, a conflict much closer to home could be looming over the horizon.

Biden’s appointment has reignited concerns about Nordstream 2, the gas pipeline from Russia to Germany. However, other sticking points between the EU and Russia are becoming increasingly harder to unstick: Navalny, Belarus, Ukraine, Georgia, trade and the unexpected Turkey-Russia hard power coalition. These are all pieces in a puzzle that, if left unresolved, might extend conflict between the EU and Russia far beyond the Donbas of Zelensky’s Ukraine.

Merkel can at least breathe a sigh of relief that Anthony Blinken, the US Secretary of State, vowed to not let the controversial Nordstream 2 project get in the way of German-American relations. This may keep some degree of discussion open between the European powers and their Russian neighbours, but it doesn’t look so rosy within the Union itself. Ukraine will be among one of the countries to lose the most from the pipeline, since the new pipeline travels by sea, removing the need for Russian gas to travel through Ukraine and be charged for doing so. Germany on the other hand, will have double the Russian gas exports. This doesn’t bode well for Ukraine’s transition into the EU and will leave them even more isolated between the Union and Russia.

It is this isolation that might be a factor for the closer developing ties between Ukraine and the US, which surely comes as a double blow to Russia. Ukraine already has membership to the EU and NATO, two organisations Russia greatly opposes, enshrined in its constitution and their increasing reliance on America must leave a bitter aftertaste in Putin’s mouth – a Cold War veteran himself. Ukraine has a huge value in Russian culture - Kiev was the birthplace of the Russian nation after all – and Russia is watching it be emphatically dragged westwards.

Russia’s borders aren’t looking too friendly in the caucuses either. Just two weeks ago, the EU Association Council met with Georgia to continue its fostering for its bid to gain EU Membership in 2024. The result of the meeting was a condemnation of Russia breaking the European Convention on Human Rights in Georgia and a demand they withdraw their forces from the country.  It couldn’t be more of a blow aimed at Russia if anti-Russian von der Leyen had tried herself.

Russia’s protective influence sphere is waning to Europe, but perhaps the most dangerous encounter between the pair was centred around Navalny. October last year saw travel restrictions on and assets frozen of six Russians by the Union following the poisoning attempt. The start of this month then saw another 4 Russian Officials sanctioned due to the arbitrary arrest of Navalny and many protestors early in the year. Russia had shown their disapproval of European meddling in internal affairs at the start of February already, expelling three EU diplomats during Foreign Minister Borrell’s visit to the home of the former Soviet Union. If the EU aren’t careful, any sort of normalised relations between them and Russia may grow impossible. There is a balance between condemning Russia’s actions whilst retaining mediums through which to solve disputes – a balance looking worryingly harder to achieve with the latest Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime adopted by the EU.

EU Foreign Minister Borrell’s visit was a wasted opportunity to build respect. Russia played him like a puppet and all he had to say was “Europe and Russia are drifting apart” - as if we didn’t know that already.

The EU’s incompetence at handling Russian affairs has been made strikingly clear by the situation in Belarus. Lukashenko has remained in power since last August’s fraudulent elections, despite EU sanctions and mass protests. He has the backing of Putin through much needed loans and also the promise of Russian police forces should they be needed. This is clearly a threat to which the EU have backed down from. However, the growing unrest and hunger for a violent overthrow in the country should not be feared by the EU and its marionette Svetlana Tikhanovskaya.

In fact, hard power might eventually be a required measure for dealing with Russia after the cosying up between Turkey’s Erdogan and Putin. The historically unlikeliest of friends have found mutual respect for their repressive approach to internal opposition in their countries. This is all sweetened by the Russian sale of arms to Turkey; something which should be ringing alarm bells for NATO, since Turkey is one of their members, and for the EU, who Turkey is incessantly trying to join but is being disregarded by (another thing Putin and Erdogan can relate to).

The question remains: is there a way to stop the next iron curtain?

Maybe Germany could be the answer again. Merkel has shown her steely nerves in backing the Nordstream 2 project but the pipeline is part of a much bigger business picture. 4,000 German firms have a presence in Russia, far more than any other European country. This includes car tycoon Herbert Diess’ Volkswagen – a gem of German manufacturing. Importantly, a survey by the German-Russian Chamber of Commerce found that 70% of its members were not put off doing business in Russia despite the dramatic deterioration in political relations.

We have recently seen the danger of business and politics blurring in China, where companies such as H&M are torn between business incentives in China and governments back home shooting human rights condemnations at the PRC for exploiting the wool making Uyghur Muslims. Germany has proven its ability to limit political interference in business and thus has maintained a channel through which they can normalise discussions with Russia - from this the rest of the EU should learn.

The Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) recommends likewise a tripartite engagement between the EU, China and Russia through the Eurasian Economic Union and EU-China connectivity platform. This is geopolitically sound and would give Russia the recognition and independence it feels it needs without sacrificing the EU’s integrity. CEPS also advises identifying shared EU-Russia interests on extra-regional issues to increase collaboration; this is an approach advocated by Germany’s foreign minister too. There will always be disagreements around Europe but even the EU knows the world is bigger than the one continent. A most obvious place to start would be climate change as Russia and the EU are both proponents of lower-carbon initiatives and their environmental policies have a strong bearing on the other’s.

Of course, these are just some of the possible stages in a complex process but throughout it all, the European Union can simply not afford to disregard or postpone discussions of and with Russia. They might be forgiven for the last summit, where Covid was a priority, but escalating conflict with the largest country on the planet may cause more harm and death than Covid ever will. If that’s the case, then a war between the EU and Russia might not be quite so cold.

Elliot Wood